作业帮英语翻译THE AGENCY THEORY AND PERFORMANCE REVIEWSThe agency mode
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英语翻译
THE AGENCY THEORY AND PERFORMANCE REVIEWS
The agency model of the firm suggests that the principal invests in a production process under the control of an agent.The agent is privately informed as to the firm’s capital productivity.The agent can report to the principal on the productivity realisation and can divert some of the principal’s investment from production to personal (non-pecuniary) consumption (Baiman,1990).
Firms invest in performance reviews1 to monitor and control the agents’ opportunism and behaviour (Eisenhardt,1989).Performance reviews put in action and bring the firm’s performance measurement systems to life,such as balanced scorecards,performance prisms,budgeting systems and accounting systems.A critical decision for the principal is to design the firm’s performance management review.The principal has two basic options to control the firm’s outcomes.The first option and most widely used is the principal invests in performance reviews including a performance measurement system.
Such investments reveal the agent’s behaviour to the principal.The second option is to contract on the outcome-based contract motivates behaviour by co-alignment of the agents’ preferences with those of the principals.E.g.link performance measurement systems to agents’ compensations.The problem with this second option is that outcomes would be subject to factors suc h as government policies,economic climate,competitors actions,etc (Eisenhardt,1989).Baiman (1990) reports that increasing ‘the performance reviews and agents’ rents’ the principal is able to reduce the production distortions by a greater amount than just using performance reviews,although in practice,the benefits of this correlation are in discussion.
Research by Kumar (1989) and Suh and Kim (1989) shows a correlation between firm’s productivity and performance reviews (Baiman,1990).I.e.the principal will invest more in performance reviews when the agent communicates low productivity and outcomes.The more money is spent on reviewing the agents’ action,the more accurate the performance review are.On the contrary,when the agent reports high productivity the principal will invest less in the firm’s performance reviews,therefore the reviews are less accurate.Some practitioners add that principals increase the investment on performance reviews when the firm’s capital investments are limited and/or when the firm’s objectives become more ambitioon.
THE AGENCY THEORY AND PERFORMANCE REVIEWS
The agency model of the firm suggests that the principal invests in a production process under the control of an agent.The agent is privately informed as to the firm’s capital productivity.The agent can report to the principal on the productivity realisation and can divert some of the principal’s investment from production to personal (non-pecuniary) consumption (Baiman,1990).
Firms invest in performance reviews1 to monitor and control the agents’ opportunism and behaviour (Eisenhardt,1989).Performance reviews put in action and bring the firm’s performance measurement systems to life,such as balanced scorecards,performance prisms,budgeting systems and accounting systems.A critical decision for the principal is to design the firm’s performance management review.The principal has two basic options to control the firm’s outcomes.The first option and most widely used is the principal invests in performance reviews including a performance measurement system.
Such investments reveal the agent’s behaviour to the principal.The second option is to contract on the outcome-based contract motivates behaviour by co-alignment of the agents’ preferences with those of the principals.E.g.link performance measurement systems to agents’ compensations.The problem with this second option is that outcomes would be subject to factors suc h as government policies,economic climate,competitors actions,etc (Eisenhardt,1989).Baiman (1990) reports that increasing ‘the performance reviews and agents’ rents’ the principal is able to reduce the production distortions by a greater amount than just using performance reviews,although in practice,the benefits of this correlation are in discussion.
Research by Kumar (1989) and Suh and Kim (1989) shows a correlation between firm’s productivity and performance reviews (Baiman,1990).I.e.the principal will invest more in performance reviews when the agent communicates low productivity and outcomes.The more money is spent on reviewing the agents’ action,the more accurate the performance review are.On the contrary,when the agent reports high productivity the principal will invest less in the firm’s performance reviews,therefore the reviews are less accurate.Some practitioners add that principals increase the investment on performance reviews when the firm’s capital investments are limited and/or when the firm’s objectives become more ambitioon.
该机构的理论和表现评语
该机构模型,该公司的建议,主要投资在一个生产过程控制下的一剂.代理人私下告知,以该公司的资本生产率.代理人可以报告主要对生产力的变现和可转移的一些主要的投资从生产到个人（非金钱）消费（ baiman ,1990年） .
公司投资于业绩reviews1监测和控制代理人的机会主义行为和行为（艾森哈特,1989年） .表现评语付诸表决,在行动上,并把公司的业绩计量系统的生命,如平衡计分卡,绩效棱镜,预算编制制度和会计制度.一个关键的决定,主要是设计公司的绩效管理检讨.主要有两个基本方案,以控制该公司的成果.第一个选项,并使用最广泛的是主要投资于业绩评语包括性能测量系统.
这种投资揭示了代理人的行为,以校长.第二个方案是对合同的结果,基于合约的行为动机合作,定线,代理商的偏好与那些校长.例如：连接性能测量系统,以代理人的赔偿.这个问题与这第二个选择是,结果会受到成功的因素,每小时政府的政策,经济气候下,竞争对手的行动,等（艾森哈特,1989年） .baiman （ 1990 ）报告说,越来越多'的表现,评语和代理人的'租金'主要是可以减少生产的扭曲由一个更大的数额比刚刚使用性能的评语,虽然在实践中,带来的好处,这是在相关的讨论.
研究库马尔（ 1989年）和徐和金（ 1989年）表明,之间有关联公司的生产率和业绩评语（ baiman ,1990年） .即主要的投资将更多地表现评语时,代理人沟通,生产率低和成果.越多的钱是用在检讨代理商的行动,更准确地表现检讨.与此相反,当代理商的报告,高生产力的主要投资将减少在该公司的表现评语,因此,评语是不太精确.一些练习者补充一点,就是校长,增加投资,表现评语时,该公司的资本投资是有限的和/或当该公司的目标变得更加
该机构模型,该公司的建议,主要投资在一个生产过程控制下的一剂.代理人私下告知,以该公司的资本生产率.代理人可以报告主要对生产力的变现和可转移的一些主要的投资从生产到个人（非金钱）消费（ baiman ,1990年） .
公司投资于业绩reviews1监测和控制代理人的机会主义行为和行为（艾森哈特,1989年） .表现评语付诸表决,在行动上,并把公司的业绩计量系统的生命,如平衡计分卡,绩效棱镜,预算编制制度和会计制度.一个关键的决定,主要是设计公司的绩效管理检讨.主要有两个基本方案,以控制该公司的成果.第一个选项,并使用最广泛的是主要投资于业绩评语包括性能测量系统.
这种投资揭示了代理人的行为,以校长.第二个方案是对合同的结果,基于合约的行为动机合作,定线,代理商的偏好与那些校长.例如：连接性能测量系统,以代理人的赔偿.这个问题与这第二个选择是,结果会受到成功的因素,每小时政府的政策,经济气候下,竞争对手的行动,等（艾森哈特,1989年） .baiman （ 1990 ）报告说,越来越多'的表现,评语和代理人的'租金'主要是可以减少生产的扭曲由一个更大的数额比刚刚使用性能的评语,虽然在实践中,带来的好处,这是在相关的讨论.
研究库马尔（ 1989年）和徐和金（ 1989年）表明,之间有关联公司的生产率和业绩评语（ baiman ,1990年） .即主要的投资将更多地表现评语时,代理人沟通,生产率低和成果.越多的钱是用在检讨代理商的行动,更准确地表现检讨.与此相反,当代理商的报告,高生产力的主要投资将减少在该公司的表现评语,因此,评语是不太精确.一些练习者补充一点,就是校长,增加投资,表现评语时,该公司的资本投资是有限的和/或当该公司的目标变得更加