作业帮微观经济,关于纳什均衡的题目,求指教,
来源：学生作业帮 编辑：作业帮 分类：英语作业 时间：2024/07/03 10:31:11
微观经济,关于纳什均衡的题目,求指教,
1.单选.
In a Nash Equilibrium of a two player game,both players:
A.Maximise their own payoff given the action of their opponent.
B.Always maximise total surplus.
C.Obtain a Pareto dominated outcome.
D.Would always be better off if they choose to cooperate.
E.None of the above.
2.有如下的payoff matrix:两人只关心自己的收益.
请问这个情况下的纳什均衡是不是(1,1)?
3.同上,两人只关心自己的收益.
请问此时的纳什均衡是什么?
4.情况改变,Column想最大自己受益,但不希望对方无收益.Row不希望对方有任何受益.此时的纳什均衡是哪种组合?
5.囚徒困境的题目,
In an infinitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma game in which players care only about monetary payoffs,can a NE making cooperation the only observed action happen?
Yes,if players observe the lower payoff from defecting.
Yes,if both players have previously shaken hands and agreed to cooperate.
Yes,if both players use punishment strategies.
Yes,only after at least 3 repetitions have elapsed.
No.
麻烦给出简明的解释,快看晕了,好的追分!
1.单选.
In a Nash Equilibrium of a two player game,both players:
A.Maximise their own payoff given the action of their opponent.
B.Always maximise total surplus.
C.Obtain a Pareto dominated outcome.
D.Would always be better off if they choose to cooperate.
E.None of the above.
2.有如下的payoff matrix:两人只关心自己的收益.
请问这个情况下的纳什均衡是不是(1,1)?
3.同上,两人只关心自己的收益.
请问此时的纳什均衡是什么?
4.情况改变,Column想最大自己受益,但不希望对方无收益.Row不希望对方有任何受益.此时的纳什均衡是哪种组合?
5.囚徒困境的题目,
In an infinitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma game in which players care only about monetary payoffs,can a NE making cooperation the only observed action happen?
Yes,if players observe the lower payoff from defecting.
Yes,if both players have previously shaken hands and agreed to cooperate.
Yes,if both players use punishment strategies.
Yes,only after at least 3 repetitions have elapsed.
No.
麻烦给出简明的解释,快看晕了,好的追分!
1.A 这个是基本概念吧
B的话他俩的total surplus 从来都不是concern
C.D都不一定的,要看具体情况
2.（1,1）
3.左上的（2,3）以上用的是划线法,书上应该有教的,不懂的我在慢慢说吧
4.（3,0）和（1,0）
5.1对2错3不一定4错
再问： 谢谢大神, 还有一题 , When might a Nash Equilibrium not be Subgame Perfect? When players are 100% credible. If players must move sequentially. If players must move simultaneously. If the players each only make one decision. If the players dislike each other. 选2是么?? 谢谢!
再答： 选1，具体可以看下WIKI里的NE里NE and non-credible threats那段
再问： 那2错在哪里了.... 1 的话, 100%credible的意思是不是说两个player不rational?
再答： 是，2的话move sequentially还是simultaneously和这题没关系啊。。
B的话他俩的total surplus 从来都不是concern
C.D都不一定的,要看具体情况
2.（1,1）
3.左上的（2,3）以上用的是划线法,书上应该有教的,不懂的我在慢慢说吧
4.（3,0）和（1,0）
5.1对2错3不一定4错
再问： 谢谢大神, 还有一题 , When might a Nash Equilibrium not be Subgame Perfect? When players are 100% credible. If players must move sequentially. If players must move simultaneously. If the players each only make one decision. If the players dislike each other. 选2是么?? 谢谢!
再答： 选1，具体可以看下WIKI里的NE里NE and non-credible threats那段
再问： 那2错在哪里了.... 1 的话, 100%credible的意思是不是说两个player不rational?
再答： 是，2的话move sequentially还是simultaneously和这题没关系啊。。