英语翻译The principal objective of this section is to show that

英语翻译
The principal objective of this section is to show that credit market imperfections and
sectoral asymmetry can significantly amplify credit shocks to the real economy during
downturns.Our framework is an extension of the BGG "financial accelerator"
mechanism.This involves the link between external finance premium (the difference
between the cost of external funds and thé opportunity of internal funds) and the net
worth of potential borrowers.With credit-market frictions,standard models of lending
with asymmetric information imply an inverse relationship between the external finance
premium and a borrower's net worth.This inverse relationship arises because when
borrowers have little wealth to contribute to project financing,the potential divergence of
interest between the borrower and the lender of external funds is greater,implying
increased agency costs to compensate the lenders.This external finance premium
generates the nonlinear upward portion of the capital supply curve when internal funds
are not sufficient to finance a capital purchase.Therefore,the borrower's net worth is
pro-cyclical and the external finance premium is counter-cyclical,enhancing the swings
in borrowing,and thus in investment,and total output (see panel 1 and 2 of figure 7).
Swings can be further amplified after introducing sectorally asymmetric credit
constraints and the real exchange rate effect.Following the initial impact of credit
shocks,real exchange rate depreciation further reduces the net worth of N sector firms,
resulting in increasing external finance premium.In addition,the N sector faces a more
restricted credit constraint than the T sector; in other words,the external finance premium
is more responsive to a change of net worth in the N sector.The nonlinear portion of the
cost-of-fund curve is steeper.These two effects reinforce each other,resulting in higher
borrowing cost,and larger investment and output drop in the N sector relative to the T
sector (compare panel 3 of Figure 7 with panels 1 and 2).

本节的一般目的是演示信贷市场的不完善和部门性的不对称,当经济低迷时可严重放大对实体经济的信贷冲击.我的框架是自BGG的“经融加速器”机制延伸而来.本框架与连接外部金融贴现水平（外部基金成本与内部基金的机会之间的差值）和潜在贷款人的净值相关.考虑到信贷市场的摩擦,在信息不对称时的借款的标准模型揭示了外部金融贴现与借款人净值之间的反转关系.这种反转关系当借款人仅有少量财产可用于项目融资,借款人与外部基金放款人之间关于利息的潜在分歧增大时产生,并揭示补偿放贷人的代理成本增加.外部金融贴现当内部基金不能满足资金交易时,在资金供应曲线上产生非线性的上升部分.因此,借款人的净值产生正周期而外部基金贴现是负周期,加大了借款的市场的摆动,然后传递到投资领域,和总产出（见图7的表1和表2）
当引入借贷紧缩的部门性的不对称和实际汇率作用后,上述摆动可被进一步放大.紧接信贷的初始冲击而来的,实际汇率贬值进一步降低了N部门公司的净值,导致外部金融贴现的增加.另外,N部门比T部门面临更多的信贷紧缩限制,换句话说,外部金融贴现对N部门净值变化作出更多的反应.融资成本曲线的非线性部分更陡.这两个 作用相互加强,导致N部门相较T部门而言,借款成本更高,以及投资和产出更大下滑,（比较图7的表与表1、表2）