英语翻译While the execute-only memory (XOM) architecture,and the

英语翻译
While the execute-only memory (XOM) architecture,and the architecture for tamper evident and tamper resistant processing (AEGIS),are not strictly examples of trusted computing platforms,they also provide strong process isolation through the development of hardened processors.The XOM architecture of Lie et al.[46,47] attempts to fulfil two fundamental objectives:preventing unauthorised execution of software and preventing software consumers from examining protected executable code.This is achieved through the provision of on-chip protection of caches and registers,protection of cache and register values during context switching and on interrupts,and confidentiality and integrity protection of application data when transferred toexternal memory.
The architecture for a single chip AEGIS processor bears a strong resemblance to the XOM architecture described above.\AEGIS provides users with tamper evident authenticated environments in which any physical or software tampering by an adversary is guaranteed to be detected,and private and authenticated tamper resistant environments,where,additionally,the adversary is unable to obtain any information about software and data by tampering with,or otherwise observing,system operation" [79].The concept of a secure boot process,another key issue related to the notion of trusted computing,has been widely discussed in the literature,most notably by Tygar and Yee [90],Clark [22],Arbaugh,Farber and Smith [5] and Itoi et al.[42]
Finally we note that trusted computing has been the subject of a considerable amount of criticism.Suggestions have been made that trusted computing is both a potential threat to user privacy and a threat to the ability of the owner of a PC to use it however he or she wishes.It is outside the scope of this paper to describe all the issues raised; we simply note that some of the
most outspoken criticism is due to Anderson [3] and Arbaugh [4].
3 Trusted Computing Components
Trusted computing,as discussed here,relates directly to the types of system proposed by the TCG.That is,for our purposes a trusted system is one that can be relied on to behave in a particular manner for a specific purpose.Since its release,trusted computing has become synonymous with three fundamental concepts:

While the execute-only memory (XOM) architecture,and the architecture for tamper evident and tamper resistant processing (AEGIS),are not strictly examples of trusted computing platforms,they also provide strong process isolation through the development of hardened processors.The XOM architecture of Lie et al.[46,47] attempts to fulfil two fundamental objectives:preventing unauthorised execution of software and preventing software consumers from examining protected executable code.This is achieved through the provision of on-chip protection of caches and registers,protection of cache and register values during context switching and on interrupts,and confidentiality and integrity protection of application data when transferred toexternal memory.
然而XOM架构和AEGIS环境（用于发现和保护非法篡改企图）严格来说并不属于“可信计算平台”的用例.可信计算平台提供增强的硬件处理器来实现进程隔离.XOM架构试图实现两个基本的目标：一是防止非授权的软件执行,二是防止可执行代码被软件用户窥视.这是通过提供：片内受保护的缓存和寄存器、在上下文切换（进程切换）和中断发生时时受保护的缓存和寄存器值、用户数据在转移到外部存储器时的加密性和完整性保护来实现的.
The architecture for a single chip AEGIS processor bears a strong resemblance to the XOM architecture described above.\AEGIS provides users with tamper evident authenticated environments in which any physical or software tampering by an adversary is guaranteed to be detected,and private and authenticated tamper resistant environments,where,additionally,the adversary is unable to obtain any information about software and data by tampering with,or otherwise observing,system operation" [79].The concept of a secure boot process,another key issue related to the notion of trusted computing,has been widely discussed in the literature,most notably by Tygar and Yee [90],Clark [22],Arbaugh,Farber and Smith [5] and Itoi et al.[42]
AEGIS处理器与前面描述的XOM架构具有很强的相似性.AEGIS提供给用户发现篡改的可信环境,在此环境中任何通过硬件或软件的篡改企图被保证能够监测到.此外,AEGIS也提供一个私有的可信的防篡改环境,在这里,对手不能篡改窃取任何软件信息和数据,也不能窥视系统所做的操作.安全启动进程的概念以及与可信计算相关的关键话题都在本文被广泛讨论.
Finally we note that trusted computing has been the subject of a considerable amount of criticism.Suggestions have been made that trusted computing is both a potential threat to user privacy and a threat to the ability of the owner of a PC to use it however he or she wishes.It is outside the scope of this paper to describe all the issues raised; we simply note that some of the
most outspoken criticism is due to Anderson [3] and Arbaugh [4].
最后,我们主要到可信计算处理器已经成为一门广为批评的话题.民众意见都认为,可信计算机处理器不但是个人用户的潜在威胁,还是对所有个人电脑使用者期待怎么使用它的能力的一种威胁.这些问题都超出了书上描述的范围,我们只能简单注意来自安德森和阿伯格的一些最坦率的批评.
3 Trusted Computing Components
Trusted computing,as discussed here,relates directly to the types of system proposed by the TCG.That is,for our purposes a trusted system is one that can be relied on to behave in a particular manner for a specific purpose.Since its release,trusted computing has become synonymous with three fundamental concepts:
可信的计算处理器组成部分
就像上面提及的那样,可信计算处理器直接联系到由TCG推荐的那种类型系统.换而言之,可信计算处理器符合我们的意图,它是依赖以特别方式表现特定的目的的一种机器.通过介绍,可信计算处理器已经成为与三个基本概念类似.
再问： 太好了。谢谢。可以意译，让它更通顺一点
再答： 信，达，雅。三个翻译的水平！追求雅，需要时间琢磨的。 评定好的同时，可千万不要忘记鼓励一下我哦！！